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The advanced passive pressurized water reactor (PWR) is being constructed in China and
the passive residual heat removal (PRHR) system was designed to remove the decay heat.
During accident scenarios with increase of heat removal from the primary coolant system,
the actuation of the PRHR will enhance the cooldown of the primary coolant system. There
is a risk of power excursion during the cooldown of the primary coolant system. Therefore,
it is necessary to analyze the thermal hydraulic behavior of the reactor coolant system
(RCS) at this condition. The advanced passive PWR model, including major components in
the RCS, is built by SCDAP/RELAP5 code. The thermal hydraulic behavior of the core is
studied for two typical accident sequences with PRHR actuation to investigate the core
cooling capability with conservative assumptions, a main steam line break (MSLB) event
and inadvertent opening of a steam generator (SG) safety valve event. The results show
that the core is ultimately shut down by the boric acid solution delivered by Core Makeup
Tank (CMT) injections. The effects of CMT boric acid concentration and the activation delay
time on accident consequences are analyzed for MSLB, which shows that there is no
consequential damage to the fuel or reactor coolant system in the selected conditions.
Copyright © 2015, Published by Elsevier Korea LLC on behalf of Korean Nuclear Society.1. Introduction
The AP1000 is a two-loop 1000-MWe pressurized water reactor
(PWR). Passive safety systems are used to provide significant
and measurable improvements in plant simplification and. Cao).
d under the terms of the
ich permits unrestricted
cited.
sevier Korea LLC on behasafety [1]. The passive residual heat removal (PRHR) system
protects the plant against transients when the steam gener-
ator (SG) feedwater and steam systems fail to effectively
remove heat from the primary coolant system, and the in-
containment refueling water storage tank (IRWST) providesCreative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License (http://
non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any me-
lf of Korean Nuclear Society.
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tubes of the PRHR heat exchanger (HX) are submerged in the
IRWST and connected to the hot leg and SG outlet plenum.
Whenever the normal heat removal paths are unavailable, the
PRHR will be actuated by the density contrast between cold
water in the C-shaped tube cooled by the IRWST and hotwater
in the RCS loop. The PRHR system cooling capacity is assessed
using SCDAP/RELAP5 code [3].
The most severe core conditions resulting from an acci-
dental depressurization of the main steam system are asso-
ciated with main steam line break (MSLB) events and
inadvertent opening of an SG safety valve for an advanced
passive PWR. Both accidents result in an initial increase of
steam flow. The energy removal from the reactor coolant
system (RCS) causes a reduction of coolant temperature and
pressure. In the presence of a negative moderator tempera-
ture coefficient, the cooldown results in the insertion of pos-
itive reactivity [4]. If the most reactive rod cluster control
assembly (RCCA) is assumed to be stuck in its fully withdrawn
position after the reactor trip, there is an increased possibility
that the core can become critical and experience a power trip.
Furthermore, manual actuation of the PRHR system at time
zero is conservatively assumed in order to maximize the
cooldown of the RCS. Therefore, the thermal hydraulic
behavior of the RCS and core cooling capability maintained by
the passive core cooling system should be evaluated.
Mechanical safety analytical codes are widely used in
evaluation of advanced passive PWRs. The responses of AP600
during small break loss-of-coolant accident, main steam line
break, and SG tube rupture accident scenarios were evaluated
by RELAP5/MOD3 [5]. The AP1000 passive core cooling system
preoperational tests were simulated by RELAP5/MOD3 [6]. NRC
also used the RELAP5 code to evaluate the certification of
AP1000 [7].Fig. 1 e Mechanical safety analytical model of the advanIn this paper, thermal hydraulic analysis is performed for
the MSLB accident and inadvertent opening of an SG safety
valve accident with PRHR actuated at time zero at no load
conditions with conservative assumptions.2. Analysis methodology
2.1. Plant model
The advanced passive PWR is modeled by SCDAP/RELAP5
code, which is based on a nonhomogeneous and nonequilib-
riummodel of two-phase systems that is solved by a partially
implicit numerical scheme. It employs a comprehensive six
equation approach that minimizes the necessity of empirical
correlations.
Fig. 1 shows the components that are taken into account by
the analysis model. Each component is divided into the
necessary nodes to properly simulate the transient. Themajor
portions of the model include the reactor core, primary
coolant system, secondary loop system, and passive core
cooling system.
As for the MSLB, the coolant temperatures in the two sides
of the core are different due to the large difference between
the broken loop and intact loop. To accurately model the
characteristics of the accident, the reactor pressure vessel
(RPV) should be divided into two separate channels from the
low head to the outlet of the active core region. Nodes 122 and
124 are connected with multiple junctions to simulate the
cross-flow in the code. There are ~10% cross turbulent flows
between the two channels. Therefore, the reactor core is
modeled as two separate channels by Nodes 122 and 124 to
simulate the temperature difference in the core during theced passive PWR. PWR, pressurized water reactor.
Table 1 e Hot standby conditions.
Parameter Unit Design Calculation Error, %
RCS flow rate (single loop) kg/s 7585.0 7599.57 0.19
RCS hot leg temperature K 553.8 554.5438 0.134
RCS cold leg temperature K 553.8 554.532 0.132
RCS pressure MPa 15.513 15.508 0. 032
Steam pressure MPa 7.626 7.626 0.0
Nu c l E n g T e c h n o l 4 7 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 4 3 4e4 4 2436two accidents and each channel is composed of eight axial
volumes. Nodes 109 and 110 represent the RPV downcomer.
Node 130 represents the core bypass.
The primary coolant system includes two primary loops,
which are modeled separately. For each loop, the hot leg, the
two cold legs, the two reactor coolant pumps (RCPs), and the
primary side of the SG are modeled. The pressurizer is con-
nected to the hot leg of Loop 1 through the surge line. The
pressurizer safety valves, as well as the pressurizer spray
lines, are also modeled. The secondary system also includes
two loops modeled separately. For each loop, the secondary
side of the SG, the SG safety valves as Nodes 431 and 531, the
power operated relief valve as Nodes 432 and 532, the steam
line, a main steam line isolation valve as 437 and 537, and the
feed water injection are simulated. The turbine is modeled as
a time dependent volume by Node 440. The passive core
cooling systemmodel includes the PRHR, the IRWST, the core
make-up tanks (CMTs), the accumulators (ACCs), the auto-
matic depressurization system (ADS), the direct vessel injec-
tion (DVI) lines, and the connecting piping. The PRHRHX tubes
are represented by eight channels along the flow direction
inside, and the heat transfer through tubes is simulated using
heat structures.
2.2. Hot standby conditions
The analysis assumes initial hot standby conditions at time
zero. If the reactor is operating at full power (critical condi-
tion), the RCS contains more stored energy than it would
under hot standby conditions because the average coolant
temperature is higher than that at hot standby conditions.
The additional stored energy reduces the cooldown rate
before the no-load conditions of reactor coolant system tem-
perature and shutdown margin assumed in the analyses are
reached. The initial hot standby conditions calculated from
the plant model are given in Table 1, and compared with theGc
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values are in good agreement with the design values.
2.3. Heat transfer correlations
Heat transfer for the PRHR HX includes the heat transfer from
in-tube coolant to the heat exchanger wall and the heattransfer from the wall to water in the IRWST. A correlation by
Churchill and Chu [8] for the interior heat transfer of long
vertical tubes is employed as Eq. 1, and the correlation by
McAdams [9] for horizontal tubes is employed as Eq. 2.
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whereNu is the Nusselt number, Ra is the Rayleigh number for
Eq. 3, and Pr is the Prandtl number for Eq. 4. The heat coeffi-
cient of the in-tube coolant to the wall is determined by the
equation of Nu as Eq. 5. where m is fluid viscosity, Cp is fluid
specific heat at a constant pressure, k is fluid thermal con-
ductivity, r is fluid density, b is the coefficient of thermal
expansion, g is the gravitational constant, L is the significant
length, Tw is the wall temperature, Tb is the bulk coolant
temperature, h is the surface heat transfer coefficient, and D is
the heated equivalent diameter.
Due to the fact that the PRHR HX is immersed in the water
of the IRWST, for heat transfer outside the PRHR HX tubes, the
natural convection heat transfer of tube walls in large volume
given by Shah [10] is adopted considering cross flow, as Eq. 6.
Nucross ¼ 0:21

G
Do
m
0:62
Pr0:4 (6)
where, G is mass flux, D0 is the outer diameter of the tubes,
and m is liquid viscosity.
The overall heat transfer coefficient of the outer wall, hout,
is obtained by Eq. 7 (Kutateladze [11] correlation).
hout ¼

hparallel
2 þ hcross2
0:5
(7)
where, hcross is the cross flowheat transfer coefficient. hparallel is
the parallel flow heat transfer coefficient along the tubes,which is determined by the maximum from the tree values
calculated by the forced heat transfer coefficient (Dittus-
Boelter correlation [12], the laminar heat transfer coefficient
(Kays [13] correlation), and the natural convection heat
transfer coefficient (Churchill and Chu [8], and Incropera and
DeWitt correlation [14]). Therefore, the heat power of the
PRHR HX is determined with the inside and outside wall heat
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Nu c l E n g T e c h n o l 4 7 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 4 3 4e4 4 2 437transfer correlation combined with the boundary parameters
of the flows.
In computing the steam flow through a steam line break or
steam generator safety valve, the Henry-Fauske [15] model is
used. The critical value of the mass flux is obtained by Eq. 8.
where Gc is the mass flux, X is quality, S is the system entropy,
V is specific volume, P is pressure, h is the polytropic expan-
sion coefficient, Y is the isentropic expansion coefficient, and
Cp,v is vapor specific heat at constant pressure.3. Thermal hydraulic analysis for the
selected accident
3.1. Analysis assumptions
In an MSLB accident, a 0.13-m2 double-ended steam line
rupture is assumed. For the accident of inadvertent opening of
a steam generator safety valve, the flow area of the SG safety
valve is 0.02 m2, which is based on a steam flow of 236 kg/s at
8.27 bar with offsite power available.500 600 700 800 900 1000
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Fig. 3 e Doppler temperature coefficient. BOL, Beginning of
Life; EOL, End of Life.For both accidents, the end-of-cycle shutdown margin at
no-load, equilibrium xenon conditions, and the most reactive
RCCA stuck in its fully withdrawn position are assumed. The
most negative moderator temperature coefficient corre-
sponding to the end-of-life core with the most reactive RCCA
in the fully withdrawn position is also assumed. Fig. 2 shows
the moderator temperature coefficient at different parts per
million (ppm) of boric acid and Fig. 3 gives the Doppler tem-
perature coefficient. Several pairs of numbers are entered to
define the moderator temperature reactivity as a function of
moderator temperature andDoppler reactivity as a function of
fuel temperature in the mechanical analytical code. The code
uses linear interpolation for segments between table search
argument values.
Minimum capability is considered for injection of boric
acid solution corresponding to the most restrictive single
failure in the passive core cooling system. The analysis
models the failure of one discharge valve of the CMT. Low-
concentration boric acid must be swept from the CMT lines
downstream of the isolation valves before delivery of boric
acid (3400 ppm) to the RCS. This effect has been accounted for
in the analysis. Manual actuation of the PRHR system at time
zero is conservatively assumed in order to maximize the
cooldown. Offsite power is available and the RCPs are avail-
able at the initiation of the transient, which increases the
severity of the RCS cooldown by enhancing primary-to-
secondary heat transfer.0 100 200 300 400 500 600
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Fig. 5 e Coolant temperatures.
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Nu c l E n g T e c h n o l 4 7 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 4 3 4e4 4 24383.2. Main steam line break
At time zero, the main steam line break accident happens and
the PRHR HX is conservatively actuated to maximize the
cooldown by transferring the heat into the IRWST. The mass
flow rate of the PRHR is shown in Fig. 4. The steam line rupture
results in a sudden decrease in SG dome pressure, and satu-
ration water in the SG secondary side vaporizes quickly. The
low pressure in the main steam line trips the Safeguards (“S”)
signal at 1.8 seconds and the CMT is actuated after a 15 second
delay. Coolant temperatures decrease due to the heat transfer
to the SG secondary side and the IRWST via PRHR. The coolant
temperatures are shown in Fig. 5. The water level in the
pressurizer decreases due to coolant contraction, as shown in
Fig. 6. Offsite power is assumed to be available so the nominal
reactor coolant flow is maintained. In the presence of a
negative moderator temperature reactivity coefficient, the
cooldown of the coolant temperature results in an insertion of
positive reactivity. The core becomes critical and returns to
power at 29.2 seconds, as shown in Fig. 7. When the CMT is
actuated, as shown in Fig. 8, core boric acid concentration
increases due to 3400 ppmboric acid concentrated in the CMT,
as shown in Fig. 9. The core power decreases again and the
reactor returns to subcritical. The core maximum surface
temperature remains low during the accident and the core
cladding is not damaged, as shown in Fig. 10.0 100 200 300 400 500 600
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Fig. 7 e Unitary nuclear power.The analysis results of nuclear power and core boric acid
concentration are compared with those in design control
document (DCD) [2], as shown in Figs. 11 and 12, indicating
that the calculated results are in agreement with the DCD
results. The comparison of key events sequence is shown as
Table 2, which also indicates the good agreement.
3.3. Inadvertent opening of a steam generator safety
valve
At time zero, an inadvertent opening of a SG safety valve ac-
cident happens and the PRHR exchanger is conservatively
actuated to maximize the cooldown by transferring heat to
IRWST. The steam mass flow rates of the two loops and the
pressure of the SG secondary side decrease at the beginning of
the accident, as shown in Figs. 13 and 14. Combined with the
actuation of the PRHR HX, the RCS temperature and pressure
decrease as shown in Fig. 15. The full mass coolant flow
through the reactor core is maintained because of the offsite
power available, which is shown in Fig. 16, to strengthen the
cooldown. The low Tcold “S” signal is received at 141 seconds
and the RCPs coast down at 145 seconds, resulting in a
decrease of mass flow rate through the reactor core (Fig. 16).
The CMT is actuated by a 15 second delay after the “S” signal.
Furthermore, at 151 seconds the feedwater control valves,0 100 200 300 400 500 600
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Fig. 9 e Core boric acid concentration.
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Fig. 10 e Core maximum surface temperature.
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valves (MSIV) are closed, meanwhile the main feedwater
pumps trip. After that, the steam mass flow rate in the intact
loop drops to zero, and the steammass flow rate in the faulted
loop suddenly increases to 140 kg/s and then decreases (as
shown in Fig. 13). The SG pressure in the intact loop remains at
~5.1MPa(a), and the SG pressure in the faulted loop continues
to decrease (as shown in Fig. 14).
In the presence of a negative moderator temperature co-
efficient, the cooldown of the coolant temperature results in
an insertion of positive reactivity. The core becomes critical
and returns to power at 160 seconds, as shown in Fig. 17. Boric
acid solution at 3400 ppm enters the RCS, as shown in Fig. 18,
providing enough negative reactivity to make the core power
decrease again and the reactor returns to the subcritical state.4. Influence factors analysis
During the main steam line break accident with actuation of
PRHR in hot standby conditions, boric acid solution injection
to the core by the CMT plays an important role to provide
negative reactivity. As mentioned above, the boric acid con-
centration in the CMT is 3400 ppm, and the CMT activation is
delayed by 15 secondswhen the “S” signal is tripped. The boric0 100 200 300 400 500 600
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Fig. 11 e Comparison of unitary nuclear power. DCD,
design control document.acid concentration and CMT activation time are the key in-
fluence parameters for accident consequences. Thus,
3000 ppm and 2600 ppm for boric acid concentration, 0 sec-
onds and 45 seconds delay time for CMT activation are
selected for the parameter sensitivity analysis.
The effect of CMT boric acid concentration and activation
delay time on power is shown in Table 3. The core boric acid
concentration rises slower with CMT boric acid concentration
decrease as shown in Fig. 19. The nuclear power increases
higher due to the slower insertion of negative reactivity as
shown in Fig. 20. The max core surface temperature increases
slightly higherwith the power increase as shown in Fig. 21, but
the cladding integrity is still maintained. The increase of CMT
activation delay time results in a time delay for core boric acid
concentration increase as shown in Fig. 22. The nuclear power
increases at higher elevations with the increase of CMT acti-
vation delay time as shown in Fig. 23. The max core surface
temperature increases at slightly higher elevations with the
power increase as shown in Fig. 24, but the cladding integrity
is still maintained.4.1. Concluding remarks
The advanced passive PWR model, including major compo-
nents of the primary coolant system, secondary loop, and
passive core cooling system, is built by SCDAP/RELAP5 code.
Main steam line rupture and SG safety valve inadvertentTable 2 e Sequences of key events for MSLB.
Sequences Analysis
results
time/s
Results in DCD
[2]
time/s
Main steam line rupture 0.0 0.0
“S” signal by low pressure in
steam line
1.8 1.4
Return to critical 29.2 28.8
Boric acid reach to core 38.4 37.4
Depletion of coolant in
pressurizer
58.0 54.6
DCD, design control document; MSLB, main steam line break.
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selected to analyze whether the core cooling capability is
maintained by the passive core cooling system.
The results indicate that during both selected accidents the
energy removal from the reactor coolant system causes a0 100 200 300 400 500 600
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Fig. 15 e Temperature and pressure of RCS. RCS, reactor
coolant system.reduction of coolant temperature and pressure. In the pres-
ence of a negative moderator temperature reactivity coeffi-
cient, the cooldown results in an insertion of positive
reactivity. The core becomes critical and returns to power at
no load conditions. However, the core is ultimately shut down
by the boric acid solution delivered by CMT injections. The
effect of CMT boric acid concentration and the activation
delay time on accident consequences is analyzed for MSLB.0 100 200 300 400 500 600
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Fig. 18 e Core boric acid concentration.
Table 3 e Effects of CMT boric acid concentration or CMT open time delay on power.
CMT boric acid
concentration/ppm
Ratio of peak power and full
power (%)
Change
rate (%)
CMT open time
delay/s
Ratio of peak power and full
power (%)
Change
rate (%)
3400 3.28 e 0 1.18 64.0
3000 3.99 21.6 15 3.28 e
2600 4.49 36.9 45 4.37 33.2
CMT, core makeup tank; ppm, parts per million.
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Fig. 19 e Effects on core boric acid concentration. ppm,
parts per million.
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Fig. 20 e Effects on nuclear power. ppm, parts per million.
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Fig. 21 e Effects on cladding peak temperature. ppm, parts
per million.
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Fig. 22 e Effects on core boric acid concentration. CMT, core
makeup tank.
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Fig. 23 e Effects on core power. CMT, core makeup tank.
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Fig. 24 e Effects on cladding peak temperature. CMT, core
makeup tank.
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Nu c l E n g T e c h n o l 4 7 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 4 3 4e4 4 2442The results show that a higher CMT boric acid concentration
or sooner CMT injection time results in lower nuclear power.
Simulations show no consequential damage to the fuel or
reactor coolant system in the selected conditions. However,
the influence of break size for MSLB accidents needs further
investigation.Conflicts of interest
All authors have no conflicts of interest to declare.
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